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STATE CF LTAii, ) 
) 
Pla in t i f f J . : • >pellee, ) Case No. 900225 
) 
v . ) 
) Priority No. 2 
JAMES F. GARDNER, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF CF APPELLANT 
This appeal ;.G 
second degree murder, Utah Code .\nr Section 
1,-''^^,^ ^-^ i ^ n < 
^Vr.": Richar^ ' Davidson, presiding, 1:1,1 from the April 
denying Defendant:' £ :!ciioi, - Withdraw nib pie-- v — — ~ Y -
^urisdicti -^ ~^or th^r, ippeal pursuant t •* Utan 
Code Ann. Section '/d-*--.. impniir'd. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDAPDS .OF.. If VTEW 
The Defendant raises tne : J-. JA'LMIJ L^JJUUL i i t In -
5v^n 1 ^ inPT^ **- ^  ^  Br i of t 
-"v/ersible error by 
failing t.o conduct 3 hearing JL; -,., Defencu, . ,,;ui«n ciacus 
and Indian status of the situs of the crime requiring 
dismissal of this case? 
2. In the alternative, should this case be remanded 
to the District Court for a determination of the 
jurisdictional issues regarding Defendant's Indian status and 
whether the crime was committed in Indian country? 
3. Should the Defendant be allowed to withdraw his 
guilty plea from the charge of second degree murder, a first 
degree felony, for the reason that he did not knowingly and 
voluntarily enter that plea? 
As to issues one and two above, the standard of review 
is whether the District Court was without jurisdiction in 
accepting the guilty plea and entering judgment against the 
Defendant, or whether the case should be remanded to the 
District Court for a determination as to the jurisdictional 
issues. 
The standard of review with regard to the issue of 
whether the Defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty 
plea, is whether it clearly appears from the record as a whole 
that the trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to 
allow Defendant to withdraw a guilty plea which was entered 
without complying with Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e), Utah Code Ann. 
Section 77-35-11. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
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statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the Issues 
presented on. appeal i s contained i n the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE C A ^ 
Defendant, Janes F. Gardner, was charged with second degree 
- "* '
 r
 • amended 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
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where he was bound over for trial ir rh:- eighth Judicial 
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District Court. 
On April 2, 1985, Defendant appeared together with his 
counsel in the Eighth Judicial District Court and entered a 
plea of guilty to second degree murder, a first degree felony, 
pursuant to a negotiated plea upon an amended information. 
Defendant did not raise the jurisdictional issue relating to 
his Indian status at that time because the same judge who had 
denied a hearing of those issues sat to take Defendant's plea. 
There was no written plea affidavit and the plea was entered 
pursuant to the colloquy reflected in Exhibit 4 of the 
Addendum. The Court accepted Defendant's guilty plea to the 
amended information. A motion to withdraw his plea of guilty 
on the basis that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made 
was denied by the Court pursuant to a decision made on April 
2, 1990. (See Exhibit 5 in the Addendum.) 
Defendant appeals from the April 2, 1990, decision and 
from the Court's denial of his challenge to the jurisdiction 
of the Court based on his claim to Indian status and claim 
that the crime occurred in Indian country. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
State v. Hagen 802 P. 2d 745 (Utah App. 1990) holds 
that the State has the burden to show that it has jurisdiction 
based on claims of Indian status of defendants and the situs 
of the crime. Defendant and his counsel raised these issues 
at his arraignment and at the March 13, 1985 preliminary 
4 
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Defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, 
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POINT I. 
DEFENDANT'c; CONVICTION SHOULD BF REVERSED FOR FAILURE 
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5 
of Uintah County, Utah, but no hearing was allowed by the 
Court as to Defendant's Indian status and whether the crime 
occurred in Indian country. The failure of the State to 
sustain its burden, and the failure of the Court to make a 
determination as to jurisdiction was occasioned in part by the 
fact that Eighth Circuit Court Judge Whitney D. Hammond 
excused himself soon after the hearing began because of a 
vehicle accident in which his daughter was involved and Judge 
Richard C. Davidson sat as judge pro tempore for the balance 
of the hearing. Defendant's Affidavit attached hereto as 
Exhibit A in the Addendum clearly demonstrates that he 
attempted to have the Court resolve the issue of jurisdiction 
and that his attorney also attempted to have the issue of 
jurisdiction resolved. There is no existing record of the 
March IS, 1985 hearing because the tape which was used to 
transcribe the hearing in the Eighth Judicial Circuit Court 
has been erased as is indicated in the Eighth Circuit Court 
Clerk's affidavit attached hereto as Exhibit 2 in the 
Addendum. By a preponderance of the evidence it is clear that 
the issue was raised before the Court. 
Under the law of the State of Utah, the State has the 
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
Defendant is not an Indian and that the crime did not occur 
in Indian country. State v, Sorenson, 758 P. 2d 477, 469-70 
(Utah App. 1988) and State v^ Haaen 802 P. 2d 745 (Utah App. 
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1990). In Hagen, the Court held that the State's failure to 
meet its burden in showing that the defendant was non-Indian 
required reversal and discharge of the defendant even if the 
State's failure to introduce evidence stemmed from a good 
faith mistake on the part of the prosecution as to who had the 
burden on the issue. 
Since the State of Utah in this case failed to meet 
its jurisdictional burden regarding the Indian status of the 
Defendant and the situs of the crime, his conviction should 
be reversed and the case should be dismissed. At the time of 
the entry of Defendant's plea, the issue of jurisdiction was 
not raised on the record for the reason that Judge Richard C. 
Davidson, who heard most of the preliminary hearing, also sat 
to take the plea, and since he had previously denied their 
requests to adjudicate these issues, Defendant and his Counsel 
did net raise them again. 
POINT II. 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, AT A MINIMUM, THIS CASE SHOULD BE 
REMANDED FOR A HEARING OF THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE 
Defendant has substantial and extensive argument to 
support his position that the State of Utah does not have 
jurisdiction in this case based on his Indian status and the 
occurrence of the crime within Indian country so that the 
Federal Courts should have exclusive jurisdiction under 
U.S.C.s. Section 1152 which states that: 
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Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the 
general laws of the United States as to the punishment 
of offenses committed in any place within the sole and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the 
District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian Country. 
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by 
one Indian against the person or property of another 
Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the 
Indian country who has been punished by the local law of 
the Tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, 
the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is, or may 
be, secured to the Indian tribes respectively. 
Part of Defendant's argument would be as follows: 
1. It is clear that all of Uintah County, prior to 
statehood, was Indian country and was occupied historically 
by various bands of the Ute Indian Tribe, including the Uintah 
Band, for hundreds of years prior to Utah's statehood. (For 
example, see Exhibit 3 in the Addendum.) 
2. When Utah became a State in 1896, as part of the 
Utah State Constitution, Article 3 Ordinance 2 required the 
citizens of the State of Utah to disclaim forever their 
jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country. That provision 
reads as follows: 
The people inhabiting this State do affirm and declare 
that they forever disclaim all right and title to the 
unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries 
hereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned 
or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and that until 
the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the 
United States, the same shall be and remain subject to 
the disposition of the United States, and said Indian 
lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and 
control of the Congress of the United States. 
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3. Ordinance 2 Article 3 of the Utah State 
Constitution has never been repealed and certainly was not 
repealed when the Land Allotment Act of 1905 was made 
effective where certain lands were withdrawn from the original 
reservation boundaries for settlement. In this case, 
Defendant is not raising an issue of fee simple ownership of 
the lands that were withdrawn, but asserts that the disclaimer 
of Article 3 Ordinance 2 was not rescinded as it relates to 
Indian jurisdiction regarding crimes. It is clear that all 
of Uintah County was recognized as part of the original Indian 
country prior to statehood. 
In the event that the conviction of the Defendant is 
not reversed for failure of the State to establish. 
jurisdiction, the matter should be remanded to the District 
Court for a determination cf the jurisdictional issues, part 
of which are summarized by Defendant above. 
POINT THREE. 
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA FROM THE CHARGE OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER, 
A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, FOR THE REASON HE DID NOT 
KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTER THAT PLEA 
The statute governing Defendant's plea, Utah Code Ann. 
Section 77-13-6 (1982) provides that a plea of guilty may be 
withdrawn as follows: 
Withdrawal of Plea. A plea of not guilty may 
be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
A plea of guilty or no contest may be 
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with 
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leave of Court. 
The taking of criminal guilty pleas is governed by 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e), Utah Code Ann- Section 77-35-ll(e) 
(Supp. 1988) which provides as follows: 
(3) The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty or no contest and shall not accept such 
a plea until the court has made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel he has knowingly waived 
his right to counsel and does not desire 
counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory self-incrimination, 
to a jury trial and to confront and cross-
examine in open court the witnesses against 
him, and that by entering the plea he waives 
all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which he 
is entering the plea; that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon 
him for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result 
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement 
and if so, what agreement has been reached. 
There was no written plea bargain affidavit in this 
case. A summary of the deficiencies noted in the colloquy 
(Transcript, Exhibit 4 of the Addendum) is set forth as 
10 
follows: 
1. The trial judge failed to advise Defendant of the 
entire statutory charge in the amended information• (See 
Transcript page 3, Exhibit 4 of the Addendum. Also see Judge 
Payne's decision page 4, lines 3 through 6, Exhibit 5 of the 
Addendum.) 
2. The Court did not ask if the Defendant knew that 
a guilty plea is an admission of all of the elements of the 
crime, and no findings were entered. 
3. The Court did not ask the Defendant if he had had 
a sufficient opportunity to discuss his rights and the 
consequences of his guilty plea with his attorney. 
4. The Court did net advise the Defendant that he had 
the right to have witnesses subpoenaed on his behalf at 
State's expense to testify at the time of trial. 
5. The Court did not advise the Defendant that he had 
a right to testify in his own behalf but if he chose not to 
do so he could not be compelled to testify or give evidence 
against himself. He was not advised that if he did not want 
to testify the jury would be told that no inference adverse 
to him could be drawn from his failure to testify. In short, 
Defendant was not advised as to his Fifth Amendment 
Constitutional rights, and no findings were entered. 
6. Defendant was not advised that if he could not 
afford to pay the costs for any appeal that those costs, 
11 
including attorney's fees, would be paid for by the State. 
7. At the time the Defendant initially entered his 
plea of guilty and the Court accepted his guilty plea and 
found that it was knowingly made, Defendant had not yet been 
advised that the sentence was for not less than five years nor 
more than life in the Utah State Penitentiary and could also 
carry a fine of up to $10,000.00. It is true that the Court 
attempted to cover that omission but that advice was not given 
prior to the entry of a plea. 
8. Following a recitation of the conduct of the 
Defendant, the Court became concerned about the factual basis 
for the plea and advised the Defendant that based on his 
statement of the facts, the County Attorney would have a 
difficult time making out a case of second degree murder. The 
Defendant responded he just did not want to take the case 
through trial. (See Addendum, Exhibit 4, page 12, line 17.) 
This statement should have caused the Court tc conduct a much 
more thorough colloquy with regard to Defendant's rights. 
9. There was no inquiry as to the age of the Defendant 
and his ability to read and understand the English language. 
Neither was there any inquiry nor findings regarding whether 
the Defendant was under the influence of drugs, medication or 
intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea was made. 
There was no inquiry nor findings as to whether the Defendant 
suffered from any mental condition which affected his ability 
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to understand what he was doing at the time of the plea or 
what he was doing when the decision to enter the plea was 
made. 
10. Defendant was not advised that because he was on 
parole that the entry of his plea in the case at hand may 
result in consecutive sentences being imposed. 
In State of Utah v*. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah 
1987), this Court examined the requirements of Rule 11(e). 
In remanding the appeal, this Court enunciated the 
requirements of accepting a guilty plea, and placed the burden 
of meeting these requirements on the trial court: 
Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of 
ensuring that Constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements 
are complied with when a guilty plea is entered. The basis 
for that duty is found in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 
243, 244,...where the United States Supreme Court stated: 
"What is at stake for an accused facing [punishment] 
demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable 
in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he 
has full understanding of what the plea connotes and its 
consequence". Id. at 1312. 
Citing Henderson v. Morganf 426 U.S. 637 (1976), the 
Court in Gibbons adopted the Henderson standard, requiring 
more than a reliance on the Defense Counsel's explanation of 
the law to the facts of the case. 
[I]t is too late in the day to permit a guilty plea to 
be entered against a defendant solely on the consent of 
the Defendant's agent-his lawyer. Our cases make 
absolutely clear that the choice to plead guilty must be 
defendant's; it is he who must be informed of the 
consequences of his plea and what it is he waives when 
he pleads, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, ... and it 
13 
is in his admission that he is in fact guilty that his 
conviction will rest. 
The Court further held that: 
Because of the importance of compliance with Rule 11(e) 
and Boykin, the law places the burden of establishing 
compliance with those requirements on the trial judge. 
It is not sufficient to assume that defense attorneys 
make sure that their clients fully understand the 
contents of the affidavit. Id. at 1313. 
Counsel for the State asserts that the Utah Supreme 
Court has adopted the "record as a whole" approach in 
reviewing the validity of guilty pleas under Rule 11(e) as set 
forth in Warner v. Morris, 709 P. 2d 309 (Utah 1985); Brooks 
v^ Morris, 709 P. 2d 310 (Utah 1986); and State v^ . Miller, 
718 P. 2d 403 (Utah 1986). In this case the State would ask 
the Court to look at voluntary statements of James F. Gardner, 
affidavits of defense counsel, and other information outside 
of the plea hearing transcript. In Judge Payne's decision, 
he also relied on information outside of the plea hearing 
transcript and held that the failure of Judge Davidson to 
advise the Defendant of his Constitutional right against self-
incrimination was satisfied by the fact that he had been given 
his Miranda warnings by police officers en two occasions at 
the time of his arrest. Clearly Rule 11(e) and State v. 
Gibbons require that the trial court judge ensures that 
Constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are met during the 
plea hearing. 
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The transcript of the plea hearing clearly shows that the 
trial court judge failed to comply adequately with Rule 11(e) 
and other Constitutional requirements in accepting Defendant's 
plea. The April 2, 1990 Decision of Judge A. Lynn Payne 
should be reversed, and Defendant should be allowed to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Defendant did not have the opportunity for a 
hearing on jurisdictional issues relating to his Indian status 
and the situs of the crime being in Indian country, his 
conviction should either be reversed or the case remanded to 
the District Court for a hearing of the jurisdictional issues. 
Defendant should also be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea 
from the charge of second degree murder, a first degree 
felony, for the reason that he did not knowingly and 
voluntarily enter that plea as is evidenced by the trial 
court's failure to comply adequately with Constitutional 
requirements and Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) Utah Code Ann. Section 
77-35-11 and the standards articulated by this Court with 
regard to those requirements. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 22nd day of April, 1992. 
Kenneth ^JSAndertbn " 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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mailed first class, postage prepaid, four (4) true and correct 
copies of the forgoing Supplemental Brief of Appellant to 
David B. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
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ADDENDUM 
E x h i b i t 1 
KENNETH G. ANDERTON #0116 
Attorney for Defendant 
110 East 100 South 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone 789-2770 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES F. GARDNER, 
Defendant, 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
James F. Gardner, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says that: 
1. I am the affiant in the above entitled matter. 
2. I am presently incarcerated in the Utah State 
Penitentiary and prior to said incarceration was a life long 
resident of the Uintah Basin within the original boundaries 
of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation of the State of 
Utah. 
3. I am a descendant of Carma Colleen Reed Gardner and 
Darrell A. Gardner and based on the blood percentage criteria 
believe that I am entitled to enrollment in the Ute Indian 
Tribe. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Case No. 900225 
4. On or about March 8, 1985, I was arrested on the Ute 
Mountain Indian Reservation of Southern Colorado and 
transported to Montezuma County Jail in Vail, Colorado, and 
later to Uintah County, Utah, and was charged with murder in 
the second degree under U.C.A. 76-5-203 1953 as amended. 
5. Upon arrest, I protested the jurisdiction of the 
State of Utah to initiate criminal proceedings and informed 
Chief William Kellogg and other tribal officers that I should 
be under tribal and federal jurisdiction. Even though there 
was some communication with Chief Lloyd Arrochis and other 
officers of the Ute Indian Tribal Police Department, I was 
extradited to Uintah County, Utah. On March 8, 1985, Vernal 
City Police Chief Robert C. Downard transported me and I, 
again, informed him that I should be under federal and tribal 
jurisdiction. 
6. On or about March 12, 1985, I was arraigned in the 
Eighth Judicial Circuit Court in Uintah County, Utah with 
Judge Whitney D. Hammond presiding. I again challenged 
jurisdiction of the State of Utah to initiate criminal 
proceedings based on my Indian status. Nothing resulted from 
my jurisdictional challenge. 
7. Between the dates of March 12 to 18 of 1985 I was 
represented by attorney at law, Lance Wilkerson who was the 
2 
Public Defender for Uintah County at that time. I asked him 
to urge the jurisdictional question. He did not pursue the 
matter as I requested. 
8. As the Preliminary Hearing proceeded on March 18, 
1985, approximately fifteen minutes into the proceeding recess 
was taken and based upon an accident involving Judge Hammond's 
daughter, he recused himself from the case and District Court 
Judge Richard C. Davidson replaced Judge Hammond where, again, 
I asked the State to remove the case to Federal Court based 
on the Indian jurisdiction issue, but my court appointed 
attorney, Lance Wilkerson, did not pursue the issue. 
9. On or about March 21, 1985, I received appointed 
counsel, Anthony J. Famulary to replace Lance Wilkerson. 
While some informal and preliminary attempts were made by my 
attorney, Anthony J. Famulary, to contest the jurisdiction 
issue, no formal hearing was ever held nor was the issue 
properly brought before the Court. 
10. I have since made inquiry as to the availability of 
a transcript of the Court proceedings and am informed that the 
Eighth Judicial Circuit Court no longer has the tapes of the 
March 18, 1985, hearing since it is their practice to erase 
the tapes and reuse them after a reasonable period of time. 
An affidavit from the Circuit Court Clerk accompanies this 
3 
affidavit indicating that she has made diligent inquiry and 
the tape is no longer available• 
11. Based upon the fact that the issue of Indian status 
and federal jurisdiction was never appropriately heard and 
adjudicated by the Court, I respectfully ask that I be given 
a hearing regarding said issue, 
-ZJZCL DATED t h i s , - y ^ ~ d a y of^EH^, 1991 Jd*, 
K t . 
1991. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this X day of-Juse^ 
C 
My commission expires:%*\^^ Notary Public 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Commission Expires 
August 1,1994 
CUNTS-FRiEL 
14000 Pony Express Rd. 
Draper, Utah 84020 
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KENNETH G. ANDERTON #0116 
Attorney for Defendant 
110 East 100 South 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone 789-2770 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES F. GARDNER, 
Defendant, 
) 
CLERK'S AFFIDAVIT 
Case No. 900225 
Cheryl Weeks, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. She is the Clerk of the Circuit Court with its 
primary location in Vernal, Utah. 
2. The Defendant, by and through his attorney, has made 
a request of the Court for a transcript of the hearing held 
on March 18, 1985. 
3. The proceedings of the Eighth Circuit Court are 
transcribed on electronic equipment and the tapes on which the 
proceedings are recorded are held for a certain length of time 
consistent with the guidelines of Circuit Courts in the State 
of Utah. 
4. The tapes which would have recorded the hearings in 
1985 are no longer available and, consequently, it is 
CfiCui: 
MAY3I 
mi 
impossible to make a transcript of the hearing requested by 
the Defendant. 
DATED this ^\9r day of May, 1991. 
CheryM Weeks 
2 
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Exhibit 3 
JITE INOIAN TERRITORY 
ca . !850 
UTE PEOPLE 
AN HISTORICAL STUDY 
Complied by 
June Lyman and Norma Denver 
Third Edition 
Uintah School District and The Western History Center 
University of Utah 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
1970 
ADDENDUM 
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uniuinnu 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUT 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
JAMES FRANKLIN GARDNER, 
DEFENDANT. 
REPORTER!S_TRANS_CRIPT 
OF HEARING 
CASE NO. 85 CR 23 
BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 2ND DAY OF 
APRIL, 1985, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 10:30 A.M., THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
DISTRICT COURTROOM OF THE UINTAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 
VERNAL, UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HEARD BY THE HONORABLE 
RICHARD C. DAVIDSON, JUDGE IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE STATE MARK W. NASH, ESQ. 
UINTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
319 WEST 100 SOUTH 
VERNAL, UTAH 8 407 8 
FOR THE DEFENDANT ANTHONY J 
ATTORNEY 
8 0 SOUTH Mil 
ROOSEVELT, UT| M434^6 4oo X AJ 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: ITEXT IS 85-CR-28, STATE OF UTAH 
VS. JAMES F. GARDNER. THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE 
COURT, MR. GARDNER HAVING WAIVED PRELIMINARY HEARING 
THIS MORNING, AND COMING UP HERE FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
ARRAIGNMENT. 
Q. (BY THE COURT) THIS BEING AN ARRAIGNMENT, IT 
IS NECESSARY THAT I ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS, MR. 
GARDNER. FIRST OF ALL IS JAMES FRANKLIN GARDNER YOUR 
TRUE AND CORRECT NAME? 
YES, SIR 
ARE YOU KNOWN BY ANY OTHER NAMES? 
NO, SIR. 
Q. FOR THE RECORD, MR. GARDNER, ARE YOU 
SUFFERING FROM THE EFFECTS OF ANY ALCOHOL OR DRUGS AT 
THIS TIME? 
Q 
NO, SIR 
DO YOU KNOW WHAT THIS PROCEEDING IS? 
A. YES, SIR 
Q. YOU UNDERSTAND YOU ARE GOING TO BE CALLED 
UPON TO ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY TO THIS 
CHARGE THIS MORNING? 
A. YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: I TAKE IT WE ARE GOTHR FnPwaon 
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ON THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, MR. NASH? 
MR. NASH: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
Q. (BY THE COURT) YOU UNDERSTAND, MR. GARDNER, 
THAT THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES YOU WITH THE 
CRIME OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, CHARGING YOU 
WITH INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY CAUSING THE DEATH OF 
ANOTHER, OR YOU COMMITTED AN ACT WHICH WAS DANGEROUS 
TO HUMAN LIFE, WHICH DID IN FACT CAUSE THE DEATH OF 
ANOTHER, OR ACTING UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENCING A 
DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE TO HUMAN LIFE, AND ENGAGED IN 
CONDUCT WHICH CAUSED THE DEATH OF ANOTHER. DO YOU 
UNDERSTAND THAT CHARGE? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. ARE YOU PREPARED TO ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY OR 
NOT GUILTY AT THIS TIME? 
A. YES 
Q. WHAT PLEA DO YOU INTEND TO ENTER? 
A. GUILTY. 
Q. BEFORE THE COURT CAN ACCEPT A GUILTY PLEA, 
MR. GARDNER, YOU MUST BE ADVISED OF YOUR RIGHTS. YOUR 
COUNSEL WILL DO THAT ON THE RECORD AT THIS TIME. I'M 
SURE HE HAS ALREADY DONE IT TO YOU BEFORE. 
YES, SIR. 
MR. FAMULARY: MR. GARDNER, YOU ARE ENTITLED 
TO HAVE A SPEEDY TRIAL IN THIS MATTER. YOU WILL BE 
ENTITLED TO VE A TRIAL BEFORE A JU YOU ALSO HAVE 
THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE III THE SELECTION OF THAT 
JURY, AND YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE ALL THE 
WITNESSES YOU HAVE AT THE TIME OF TRIAL, INCLUDING 
POLICE OFFICERS OP. WHOEVER. 
YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL THE DECISION 
THAT COMES OUT OF THAT TRIAL. IF YOU PLEAD GUILTY YOU 
ARE WAIVING ALL OF THOSE RIGHTS. DO YOU UNDERSTAND 
THAT? 
THE WITNESS: YES. 
Q. {3Y THE COURT) YOU UNDERSTAND, MR. GARDNER, 
THAT YOU HAVE A PRESUMPTION OF BEING INNOCENT UNTIL* 
PROVEN GUILTY BY ALL EIGHT JURORS. ALL EIGHT JURORS 
HAVE TO 3S CONVINCED OF YOUR GUILT 3EFORE YOU CAN BE 
FOUND GUILTY. IF ONE OF THEM SAYS NO, YOU ARE NOT 
GOING TO BE FOUND GUILTY. DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. DO YOU UNDERSTAND ALSO THAT THE BURDEN DURING 
THIS ENTIRE PROCEEDING IS ON THE STATE? THEY HAVE TO 
GO FORWARD AND PROVE EACH AND EVERY ELEMENT OF THE 
OFFENSE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. YOUR COUNSEL AMD YOU DON'T HAVE TO DO 
ANYTHING. THEY HAVE THE BURDEN OF GOING FORWARD, AND 
IF THEY FAIL IN THEIR BURDEN IN ANY WAY THEN YOU ARE 
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NOT 
ALL 
GOING 
A. 
Q. 
TO BE FOUND GUILTY. 
YES 
NOW 
» 
DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
, YOU HAVE HAD THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
THE WAY THROUGH THIS 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
YES 
ARE 
YES 
YOU 
ASSISTANCE OF 
ASSISTANCE OF 
TRIAL, OF 
A. 
Q. 
PROCEEDING, HAVE YOU NOT' 
YOU SATISFIED WITH HIS SERVICES? 
UNDERSTAND 
COUNSEL --
COUNSEL ON 
COURSE? 
YES 
AND NOBODY CAN 
THAT 
THE 
THE 
TAKE 
YOU WOULD ALSO HAVE 
RIGHT TO HAVE THE 
APPEAL LEVEL AND THE 
THAT AWAY FROM YOU, 
? 
THE 
DO 
IYOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
YES 
GARDNER? 
HAS ANYBODY PROMISED YOU ANYTHING, MR 
NO, SIR 
IN ORDER TO GET YOU TO MAKE THIS PLEA? 
A. NO, SIR. 
THE COURT: THERE ARE SOME OTHER CHARGES 
PENDING, AS I UNDERSTAND IT? 
MR. NASH: YOUR HONOR, FOR THE STATE I WOULD 
REPRESENT THAT THERE HAVE BEEN SOME CONCESSIONS MADE 
RELATING TO A THREE-COUNT THIRD DEGREE FELONY FORGERY 
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CASE THAT HAS BEEN FILED IN CIRCUIT COURT AND IS 
PENDING IN THAT COURT AT THIS TIME. FOLLOWING MR. 
GARDNER'S ENTRY OF A PLEA TO THE CHARGE CONTAINED IN 
THIS INFORMATION THE STATE WILL DISMISS THOSE CHARGES. 
CHARGE OF 
ALSO , THE STATE IS FOREGOING THE FILING 
FIRST DEGREE MURDER IN THIS CASE. IN 
ADDITION TO THAT THE STATE IS FOREGOING THE FILING 
AN AUTO THEFT 
CHARGE, WHICH 
HAVE ALLOWED. 
STATE HAS MADE 
CONCERNING THI 
RECOMMENDATION 
NONE HAVE 
Q. 
STATED BY 
A. 
Q. 
BEEN 
(BY 
THE 
YES . 
AND 
OF A 
OF 
CHARGE AND A POSSIBLE HABITUAL CRIMINAL 
THAT AUTO THEFT CHARGE MAY ALLOW OR 
THOSE ARE THE CONCESSIONS THAT THE 
THERE HAVE BEEN NO CONCESSIONS 
S IMMEDIATE CASE, AND THERE WILL BE 
MAY 
NO 
AS FAR AS LENIENCY IN SENTENCING, AND 
PROMISED. 
THE COURT) DO YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT'S 
COUNTY ATTORNEY, MR. GARDNER? 
IS IT YOUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THOSE 
AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH YOU? 
A. 
Q. 
YES . 
HAVE 
HAVE NOT BEEN 
A. 
Q. 
NO, 
HAS 
BEEN 
THERE BEEN ANY OTHER AGREEMENTS WHICH 
DISCLOSED THAT HAVE BEEN MADE WITH YOU? 
SIR. 
ANYBODY THREATENED YOU IN ANY WAY TO 
YOU TO MAKE THIS PLEA AGAINST YOURSELF? 
GET 
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NO. 
ARE YOU MAKING THIS PLEA OF YOUR OWN FREE 
WILL AND CHOICE? 
A. YES 
ARE YOU MAKING THIS PLEA BECAUSE YOU ARE IN 
FACT GUILTY OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE? 
YES . 
Q. WHAT DID YOU DO? 
A. WHAT DID I DO? 
YES 
A. I BET .ilM 
DID YOU DO THAT TO INTENTIONALLY CAUSE HIS 
DEATH? 
A. NO 
Q. DID YOU DO IT AS AN ACT CLEARLY DANGEROUS TO 
HUMAN LIFE THAT CAUSED HIM TO DIE? 
NO. 
Q. DID YOU ENGAGE IN CONDUCT WHICH CREATED A 
GRAVE RISK OF DEATH TO ANOTHER, AND THAT THEREFORE 
CAUSED DEATH? 
YES 
Q. THAT'S WHAT YOU DID? 
A. YES. 
Q. SO YOU ARE MAKING THIS PLEA BECAUSE YOU ARE 
IN FACT GUILTY OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE? 
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A. YES, SIR. 
Q. MR. GARDNER, TO THE CHARGE OF MURDER IN THE 
SECOND DEGREE, AS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT 
OCCURED ON OR ABOUT MARCH 6, 1985, WHAT IS YOUR PLEA? 
A. GUILTY. 
THE COURT: THE COURT WILL ACCEPT YOUR GUILTY 
PLEA AND FIND IT KNOWINGLY MADE. 
WHAT ARE YOUR DESIRES AS TO SENTENCING? 
MR. FAMULARY: YOUR HONOR, WE DESIRE 
SENTENCING TO BE MADE TODAY. MR. GARDNER IS ALREADY 
ON PAROLE FROM THE OREGON STATE PRISON IN SALEM, 
OREGON AND FEELS IT IS IN HIS BEST INTEREST TO WAIVE 
ALL TIME PERIODS CONCERNED THEREIN. 
Q. (BY THE COURT) YOU UNDERSTAND, MR. GARDNER, 
THAT YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE SENTENCED NOT SOONER 
THAN TWO DAYS NOR MORE THAN 30 DAYS FROM TODAY? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. IS IT YOUR DESIRE THAT I GO AHEAD AND IMPOSE 
SENTENCE TODAY? 
Q 
FROM NOW? 
YES, SIR 
YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO BE SENTENCED TWO DAYS 
A. YES. 
YOU WERE ON PAROLE AT THE TIME THIS WAS 
COMMITTED? 
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A. YES, SIR. 
Q. WHAT WAS YOUR PREVIOUS OFFENSE? 
A. WELL, I HAD A NUMBER OF NARCOTIC CHARGES THAT 
WERE DROPPED ON THAT I PLEAD GUILTY TO TRANSPORTING 
STOLEN AUTOS ACROSS STATE LINES. 
Q. THEFT CHARGES, THEN? 
A. YES. 
THE COURT: MR. NASH? 
MR. NASH: THAT'S MY UNDERSTANDING, IT WAS 
AN AUTO THEFT CHARGE. IT WAS A STATE CHARGE, NOT 
A FEDERAL CHARGE, IS MY UNDERSTANDING. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. NASH: ALTHOUGH THE LANGUAGE HE USED 
WOULD HAVE BROUGHT HIM UNDER THE FEDERAL STATUTE. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. NASH: YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY, IT WOULD BE 
THE STATE'S RECOMMENDATION IN THIS THAT NOTHING SHORT 
OF MAXIMUM BE IMPOSED, FIVE TO LIFE IN THE STATE 
PENITENTIARY. HE ADMITTED CAUSING THE DEATH OF 
ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL THAT WAS DONE UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HE HAS DESCRIBED, A SEVERE BEATING, 
AND I FEEL IT WOULD BE IN APPROPRIATE FOR ANYTHING 
SHORT OF THE MANDATORY -- OF THE MAXIMUM TO BE 
IMPOSED. 
Q. (BY THE COURT) WE DIDN'T ASK YOU THAT, 
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MR. GARDNER. PERHAPS WE SHOULD ASK YOU AGAIN. 
THIS 
YOUR 
YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THE POSSIBLE SENTENCE FOR 
MATTER IS NOT LESS THAN FIVE YEARS NOR MORE THAN 
LIFE? 
A. YES. 
Q. IN THE STATE PRISON, TOGETHER WITH A FINE OF 
UP TO $10,000? DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE PENALTIES? 
THAT 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. DOES THAT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE TO YOUR PLEA 
YOU PREVIOUSLY ENTERED? 
A. NO, SIR. 
THE COURT: ANY REASON WHY JUDGMENT SHOULD 
NOT BE PRONOUNCED? 
HERE 
MR. NASH: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. FAMULARY: WE WOULD LIKE TO ADD A COMMENT 
ABOUT THE FACTS, THAT WE HAVE SOME INFORMATION 
ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED HERE FROM TWO OR THREE PAGES OF 
POLICE REPORTS AND STATEMENTS MADE. 
APPARENTLY MR. GARDNER MET THE VICTIM AT THE 
STORE. MR. GARDNER HAD BEEN DRINKING QUITE HEAVILY 
THAT NIGHT, AND HAVING BEEN SMOKING MARIJUANA, AND WAS 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THOSE DRUGS AT THE TIME THE 
INCIDENT OCCURED. THEY WENT TO MR. ABEGGLEN'S 
RESIDENCE. MR. ABEGGLEN, ACCORDING TO MR. GARDNER, 
FRENCH KISSED HIM, WHICH UPSET MR. GARDNER, AND IN THE 
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HEAT OF PASSION KICKED HIM AND CAUSED SOME INJURY. 
AND THEN APPARENTLY HE DIED FROM THAT BEATING THAT 
RESULTED THEREFROM. 
THE COURT: IS THAT THE WAY IT HAPPENED? 
THE WITNESS: HE COMMITTED A HOMOSEXUAL ACT 
AGAINST ME, AND I DON'T CARE FOR HOMOSEXUALS. 
THE COURT: THAT CAUSED YOU TO BECOME UPSET? 
THE WITNESS: YES. 
THE COURT: WERE YOU ACTING IN THE HEAT OF 
PASSION AT THIS TIME? 
THE WITNESS: NO, SIR. I WAS --
TH£ COURT: DID YOU KNOW WHAT YOU WERE DOING 
WHEN YOU WERE KICKING HIM? 
THE WITNESS: NO. I DIDN'T. 
THE COURT: MR. NASH? 
MR. NASH: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD REPRESENT, AND 
IT'S IN THE REPORTS BASED UPON THIS, THAT I UNDERSTAND 
MR. FAMULARY RECOMMENDED HIS CLIENT, BASED UPON THIS 
REPORT, THIS PLEA IS ENTERED. THERE MAY HAVE BEEN, 
AND THERE WAS, AN INITIAL STRIKING. THE VICTIM WAS 
KNOCKED UNCONSCIOUS. THE DEFENDANT THEN HAD TIME TO 
PUT HIS SHOES ON, GO GATHER UP SOME THINGS IN THE 
HOUSE, TAKE SOME PERSONAL ITEMS BELONGING TO THE 
VICTIM, THEN AS THE DEFENDANT WAS GETTING READY TO 
LEAVE, THE VICTIM REGAINED CONSCIOUSNESS, TRIED TO GET 
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UP AND THE DEFENDANT 
A CHANCE TO COOL OFF 
THEN WENT BACK, AFTER HE HAD HAD 
AND REALIZE WHAT WAS GOING ON, 
AND ADMINISTER ANOTHER SEVERE BEATING WHICH RESULTED 
IN THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM. IT WAS NOT DONE IN THIS 
INSTANCE IN THE HEAT 
BEATING WHICH CAUSED 
BEEN MADE CLEAR TO MR 
OF PASSION. IT IS THE SECOND 
THE DEATH, AND THESE FACTS HAVE 
. FAMULARY. THESE ARE THE FACTS 
TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HIMSELF HAS ADMITTED IN AT 
LEAST TWO STATEMENTS 
SECOND 
REPORT 
SECOND 
AROUND 
BEFORE 
THE COURT: 
MADE TO POLICE OFFICERS. 
WHICH VERSION IS THE TRUE ONE? 
MR. FAMULARY: THAT'S BASICALLY CORRECT. THE 
TIME, FROM WHAT I GATHER FROM THIS POLICE 
WAS THE SECOND TIME OF ONE KICK. IT WASN'T A 
BEATING. BUT HE DID HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO GO 
AND COLLECT SOME OF THE VICTIM'S BELONGINGS 
THE SECOND TIME. 
THE COURT: 
DESCRIBED TO ME, MR. 
HAVE A 
DEGREE 
DIFFICULT TIME 
MURDER? 
THE WITNESS 
IT THROUGH A TRIAL. 
THE COURT: 
MAKE, YOU HAVE RIGHTS 
THE WITNESS 
YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU HAVE 
GARDNER, THE COUNTY ATTORNEY WILL 
MAKING OUT A CASE OF SECOND 
: YES. I JUST DON'T WANT TO TAKE 
WELL, BUT THE POINT WE HAVE TO 
THAT HAVE TO BE PROTECTED. 
YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: IF YOU ARE NOT GUILTY OF SECOND 
DEGREE MURDER THIS COURT WON'T ACCEPT A PLEA OF SECOND 
DEGREE MURDER. NOW, WHAT THE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
DESCRIBED TO ME THE JURY COULD VERY LOGICALLY CONCLUDE 
THAT DOES MEET THE LIMITS OF A SECOND DEGREE MURDER, 
IF THOSE ARE THE FACTS AS THEY OCCURED? 
THE WITNESS: YES. 
THE COURT: IT'S STILL YOUR DESIRE TO PLEAD 
GUILTY TO THAT CHARGE? 
THE WITNESS: YES. 
THE COURT: ANY REASON WHY JUDGMENT SHOULD 
NOT BE PRONOUNCED? 
MR. NASH: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. FAMULARY: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: IN THIS MATTER THE COURT 
SENTENCES MR. GARDNER TO SERVE A TERM AT THE UTAH 
STATE PRISON, INDETERMINATE, NOT LESS THAN FIVE YEARS 
AND NOT MORE THAN LIFE. EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE 
WILL BE CARRIED OUT IMMEDIATELY. 
MR. NASH: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. FAMULARY: THANK YOU. 
(WHEREUPON THIS HEARING WAS CONCLUDED.) 
* * * 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
I, MILO N. HARMON, RPR, OFFICIAL COURT 
REPORTER IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF 
UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING 
PROCEEDINGS WERE BY ME STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED AT THE 
TIMES AND PLACES HEREIN SET FORTH; THAT THE SAME WAS 
SUBSEQUENTLY BY ME CAUSED TO BE REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN 
FORM CONSISTING OF PAGES 1 THROUGH 13 BOTH INCLUSIVE; 
AND THAT THE SAME CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND CORRECT 
TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN, EVIDENCE ADDUCED, AND 
PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE. 
TO WHICH CERTIFICATION I HEREBY SET MY HAND 
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UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
APR 2 1990 
EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH _ /J A . PATttufrSWA, CLERK 
BY ^ A . 5 T DEPUTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES FRANKLIN GARDNER, 
Defendant. 
DECISION 
CASE NO.: 85CR28 
A review of the testimony and the exhibits in this matter would 
indicate: 
1. The Defendant, James Franklin Gardner, first met the victim, 
Rick Layne Abegglen, at a convenience store in Vernal on the evening of 
March 5 1985. Prior to this, the Defendant had consumed significant 
guantit es of alcohol and/or drugs. The Defendant and the victim went 
to the apartment of a friend of the Defendant's (Sherry Richens) where 
a small party was in progress. Later, the Defendant drove the victim 
to the victim's apartment to obtain beer. 
2. While the victim and the Defendant were alone at the victim's 
apartment, the victim "grabbed" the Defendant and "kissed" or "french 
kissed" the Defendant. Defendant responded to the kiss by pushing the 
victim away and immediately kicking the victim with a "karate" kick to 
the face. 
3. The force of the kick knocked the victim unconscious; and, 
while the victim laid unconscious on the floor, the Defendant held the 
victim's head with one hand (to obtain leverage) and repeatedly struck 
the victim in the face with the other hand. 
4. The Defendant then left the victim, who was still unconscious, 
and searched other areas of the victim's apartment for personal 
property to take with him. As the Defendant was putting his shoes on, 
(which he had removed upon first entering the apartment) the victim 
began to regain consciousness. As the victim attempted to stand, and 
rfhile the victim was still on his knees, the Defendant again kicked the 
victim in the area of his neck and -hit and kicked him over and over". 
5. Shortly after the second incident, the victim stopped 
breathing and the Defendant attempted to resuscitate the victim by 
pushing on the victim's chest and then by administering "mouth to 
nouth" resuscitation. The victim died before the Defendant left the 
apartment. The time of death was sometime between 12.10 a.m. and 3:00 
a.m. on March 6, 1985. 
6. There was no indication that the victim took any action 
against the Defendant after the "kiss" described above. The victim was 
unable to defend himself after the initial kick of the Defendant. In 
describing the initial beating, the Defendant indicated "....I was 
putting all the pressure on him, I was giving it all I had.M The 
Defendant indicated that he was familiar with martial arts. 
7. The Defendant then drove the victim's automobile from the 
victim's apartment to Sherry Richens apartment arriving at the Richen's 
apartment (some two miles away) at about 3:00 a.m. During the next 
several hours the Defendant drove to the apartment of Clayton 
Christensen (some two miles distance), arriving at about: 3:30 a.m.; 
then drove to the home of an aunt, Velda Rasmussen, at Roosevelt, Utah 
(some 30 miles distance) arriving at about 4:30 a.m.; then drove to the 
home of his sister, Ilona Slim, at Myton, Utah (some 8 miles distance) 
arriving at 6:30 a.m.; then drove to the home of his parents at 
Whiterocks, Utah (approximately 20 miles distance) arriving at about 
7:00 a.m.; then drove to the home of an aunt at Lapoint, Utah (more 
than 10 miles distance) arriving at about 7:15 a.m.; then drove back to 
the Richens apartment in Vernal, Utah (some 14 miles distance) arriving 
at about 9:00 a.m. During this time, the Defendnat also drove to 
Maeser, Utah (which would have been on his way from Lapoint to Vernal) 
and received some money from a cousin, Don Hendricks. 
8. Between 3:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. on March 6, 1985, the 
Defendant described the events surrounding the death of Mr. Abegglen to 
the following individuals: William Jaramillo, Sherry Richens, Robin 
McCleary, Clayton Christensen, Jennifer Thomas, Velda Rasmussen, Carma 
Gardner, Darrel Gardner, Avis Sparks, Daniel Aquilar, and Benjamin 
Murray. 
9. Although the statements of the Defendant to the police and as 
reported by the above individuals, are not entirely consistent, it is 
obvious that the Defendant possessed a recollection of the events which 
lead to the death of the victim. These statements would support the 
following: Defendant realized that he had been kissed; he recognized 
the victim's actions as being offensive, and was offended; he was 
physically capable of administering a beating to the victim and was 
capable of making "karate" type kicking motions; he was capable of 
forming an intent to search the apartment for items of value, did 
search for valuables, and took several items with him when he left the 
apartment; he was capable of finding and putting his shoes on; he was 
physically able to administer additional force against the victim (the 
"second beating"); he recognized that the victim had been seriously 
injured and took steps to resuscitate the victim; he considered calling 
for medical assistance; he recognized that the victim had died, and 
realized that he was responsible for his death; he understood that he 
could be imprisoned for causing the victim's death and decided to flee 
to avoid the punishment; before leaving the apartment he was capable of 
remembering that the keys to the victim's car had been left in the 
ignition; he was capable of driving long distances in order to obtain 
advice and monetary assistance from family and friends; and he was able 
to effectively communicate with others in describing the events which 
lead to the death of the victim. 
10- The individuals who saw the Defendant after the victim's 
death gave conflicting descriptions concerning his condition. 
Individuals described Defendant as: upset, Mpretty drunk", "messed up" 
(due to the consumption of alcohol or drugs), and as not being 
intoxicated. At the hearing in this matter, the Defendant did not 
claim to be so intoxicated that he was incapable of forming the 
requisite intent for Second Degree Murder. There is no indication in 
the statements that the Defendant gave the police or in his statements 
to his friends and relatives that the Defendant was not capable of 
forming the required intent. Indeed, a review of the Defendant's 
statements and his actions (see #9 and #11) would suppor a finding that 
he was capable of forming the intent. 
11. On March 8, 1985, the Defendant gave two voluntary 
statements, after being advised of his Miranda Rights, and waiving 
those rights on each occasion. The statements describe his initial 
meeting with the victim, relates conversations between the Defendant 
and the victim during the course of the evening and early morning hours 
of the next day, describes the various places the Defendant visited 
during that time period, and relates the conversations and events which 
lead to the death of Mr. Abegglen. After the "kiss", the Defendant's 
recollection is not as complete as prior to that incident. Defendant 
indicated that he "got real mad", "...I flipped out", " It was as if 
I couldn't stop", "...I just kept hitting him, I was screaming, I went 
beserk, I couldn't control it, I couldn't stop hitting him". In these 
statements, Defendant related two "beatings" which were separated by a 
significant period of time during which the Defendant searched the 
apartment for valuables and while he put on his shoes. (The Defendant 
admitted to taking a blanket, coat, and two coins from the apartment). 
In his testimony before this Court, the Defendant acknowledged that 
there was a period of time which separated his acts of violence towards 
the victim. The record would support a finding that there was adequate 
time between the two incidents for the Defendant to recover from his 
outrage of being "kissed". 
12. The parties agreed to a plea bargain wherein the Defendant 
would enter a plea as charged to Second Degree Murder and the 
prosecutor would dismiss three Third Degree Felony Forgery charges 
which were then pending in Circuit Court, not file First Degree Murder 
charges in this case, not file an Auto Theft charge (which was based on 
the taking of the victim's vehicle), and not file a "possible" Habitual 
Criminal charge. On April 2, 1985 the Defendant waived his right to a 
Preliminary Hearing and was taken to District Court where he entered a 
plea of guilty. 
13. At the time of the incident, the Defendant was on parole from 
the State of Oregon. He had previously been convicted of a Third 
Degree Felony in the State of Utah but had received probation for that 
offense. When the plea was entered, both parties were unsure as to 
whether the Defendant's record would support an increase in sentencing 
under the Habitual Criminal Statute. The parties, therefore, agreed to 
forego the filing of "a possible Habitual Criminal Charge". 
14. At the time of the plea: 
A. The charges as contained in the Amended Information were 
read to the Defendant by the Court. P 3. (However, the transcript 
indicates that a portion of the statutory language for the depraved 
indifference theory of Second Degree Murder was omitted when the Court 
read the Information). 
B. The Defendant indicated that he beat the victim. P 7. 
C. The Defendant denied that he beat the victim with an 
intent to cause his death or as an act clearly dangerous to human life 
which caused his death. P 7. 
D. The Defendant admitted that he engaged in conduct which 
created a grave risk of death to another, and, therefore, caused the 
death of another. P 7. 
E. The Defendant indicated that he was entering his plea 
because he was, in fact, guilty of the offense. P. 8. 
F. The Court accepted the plea. P. 8. 
G. The Defendant waived time for sentencing and requested 
that he be immediately sentenced. P. 8. 
H. At the sentencing portion of the hearing, the State 
described the incident as a "severe beating" and recommended that the 
maximum sentence be imposed. P. 9. 
I. In his statement to the Court regarding sentencing, 
counsel for the Defendant described the incident as occurring while the 
Defendant was under the influence of alcohol and drugs and after the 
Defendant had been "French Kissed". Counsel then characterized the 
incident as occurring in the "heat of passion". P. 10 and 11. 
J. The Court having received two different descriptions of 
the facts, asked the Defendant if his attorney's characterization of 
the events was accurate. P. 11. 
K. The Defendant responded that the victim had committed a 
homosexual act against him which caused him to become upset. The 
Defendant, however, denied that he was acting in the heat of passion. 
P. 11. 
L. The Defendant then indicated that he did not know what he 
was doing when he kicked the victim. P. 11. (There were two separate 
incidents wherein the Defendant kicked the victim. The record does not 
indicate which incident the Defendant was referring to. For the 
purpose of this hearing, the Court will interpret this statement as an 
indication that he did not know what he was doing on either occasion.) 
M. The prosecutor then gave the Court the State's version of 
the facts, which was: There was an initial incident where the 
Defendant was knocked unconscious; after this initial incident, the 
Defendant put on his shoes, gathered up some things in the house, and 
took some personal items belonging to the victim, the victim then 
regained consciousness and tried to get up, and after the Defendant had 
a chance to cool off and realize what was going on, the Defendant 
administered another severe beating which resulted in the death of the 
victim. The prosecutor then indidcated that the second incident did 
not occur in the heat of passion. P. 11 and 12. 
N. Counsel for the Defendant acknowledged that the 
prosecutor's version was basically correct except that the second 
incident was not a beating, it was one kick. P. 12. (NOTE: The Court 
views the facts as indicating that the attorney for the Defendant 
abandoned his prior statements that the Defendant was intoxicated 
and/or acted in the heat of passion. At the hearing to withdraw the 
plea, the attorney for the Defendant explained that, since this 
occurred at the sentencing stage of the hearing, he was merely trying 
to characterize the actions of the Defendant in the most favorable 
light possible and was not attempting to interpose defenses. Indeed, 
the attorney for the Defendant indicated that he did not consider 
intoxication or heat of passion as being viable defenses. A review of 
the evidence available to counsel would indicate that the decision not 
to rely upon these defenses was well within the wide range of trial 
tactics which competent counsel may have selected in this situation.) 
0. The Court then advised the Defendant that conviction 
would be difficult under the facts which he had described (i.e. that he 
did not know what he was doing when he kicked the victim). P 12. 
P. The Defendant indicated that he understood that a 
conviction would be difficult under the facts which he described but 
expressed a desire to enter a plea rather than go to trial. P. 12. 
Q. The Court then indicated that the facts as described by 
the County Attorney would support a finding of guilty, M if those are 
the facts as they occurred." (i.e. that he had a chance to cool off 
and realize what was going on before he administered the second 
beating.) P. 13. 
R. The Defendant acknowledged that the statement of the 
prosecutor was correct. P. 13. 
S. The Defendant then indicated that he wished to enter a 
plea of guilty and was sentenced. P. 13. 
15. The Court views the record of the plea hearing as indication 
that: the Defendant was aware that he could not be convicted if he did 
not know what he was doing; the Defendant was also aware that Judge 
Davidson would not accept a plea under the facts which he had 
described; in spite of such knowledge, the Defendant desired to enter a 
plea of guilty; the Defendant adopted the factual version of the 
prosecutor with full knowledge of the consequences of his action; the 
effect of his action in adopting the statement of the prosecutor was to 
abandon his prior statement that he did not know what he was doing and 
adopt a factual version which indicated that he knew what he was doing 
when he initiated the second attack. This Court views the foregoing as 
a waiver of the defense of heat of passion. In the context of the 
Defendant's Motion, it is the opinion of this Court that the interest 
of justice will riot be served by allowing the Defendant to attack the 
plea on the basis that he had a valid defense. Mr. Famulary briefly 
explained the defense of heat of passion to the Defendant. This and 
the Court's explanation to the Defendant that he could not be found 
guilty if he did not know what he was doing effectively communicated to 
the Defendant the essence of the heat of passion defense. In so 
holding, the Court notes that the Defendant's adoptive admissions are 
consistent with the Defendant's statements to the police, his family 
and friends and his statement to his counsel that he knew what he was 
doing when he initiated the second attack upon the victim. 
16. Mr. Famulary testified that he took a copy of the statute to 
the jail and reviewed the statutory requrements for First and Second 
Degree Murder (including the intent requirement under the deprave 
indifference portion of the Second Degree Murder Statute). Mr. 
Famulary testified that the Defendant would not enter a plea to a crime 
which required a specific intent to cause the death of another. After 
reviewing the statute with counsel, the Defendant decided to plead 
guilty to the depraved indifference portion of the statute. Mr. 
Famulary further testified that the Defendant indicated to him that he 
knew what he was doing when he initiated the second attack upon the 
victim (this is also consistent with the statements that the Defendant 
gave the police). At the plea hearing, the Defendant first informed 
the Court of his intent to enter a plea of guilty. Nevertheless, when 
questioned concerning the first two ways of committing the offense, the 
Defendant indicated that he was not guilty. It is obvious to this 
Court that the Defendant was aware that there was another portion of 
the statute which he was prepared to plead guilty to, a statutory 
provision which did not require an intent to cause the death of 
another. Based upon the above and a review of the evidence and after 
listening to the evidence present at the hearing on the Defendant's 
motion, the Court finds that, prior to attending the plea hearing, the 
Defendant's attorney had advised the Defendant of the various ways that 
homicide could be committed under the First and Second Degree Homicide 
statutes, including the intent requirement under the depraved 
indifference statute and that the Defendant was aware of the mental 
element of the depraved indifference portion of the Second Degree 
Murder Statute when he entered his plea. 
17. The statement of the Defendant that he did not know what he 
was doing when he kicked the victim, was treated as an indication that 
the Defendant was acting in the heat of passion. This statement could 
have also applied to the defense of intoxication. The Defendant has 
never directly claimed that he was intoxicated to a degree that he 
could not form the intent, and the Court's findings of waiver 
(paragraph 15) are equally applicable to intoxication. Further, a 
review of the Defendant's statements and actions before, during, and 
after (paragraph 9 & 11)'would indicate that intoxication may have been 
a difficult deferise to rely upon . Finally, the Court had received 
statements from the Defendant at the plea hearing which would indicate 
that the Defendant was capable of forming an intent in this case. 
Q (Court) What did you do? 
A (Defendant) What did I do? 
Q (Court) yes. 
A (Defendant) I beat him. P. 7. 
Q (Court) Is that the way it happened? 
A (Defendant) He committed a homosexual act against me, and I 
don't care for homosexuals. 
Q (Court) That caused you to become upset? 
A (Defendant) yes. P. 11. 
The above statements indicate an awareness that is inconsistent 
with the defense of intoxication. Defndant knew a homosexual advance 
had been made, was offended and became upset, and was physically 
capable of administering a severe beating which caused the death of the 
victim. The adoption of the Defendant of the prosecutor's statements 
also indicate an awareness which is inconsistent with the defense of 
Intoxication. The ability of the Defendant to form the intent to 
search the apartment and take property and his actions before, during, 
and after the death of the victim would support a finding that he could 
form the required intent. 
18. While the Defendant was incarcerated and before his plea, he 
was visited by a social worker, Tina Gurule. During the time she 
visited with Defendant, she reported that his condition would vary from 
day to day. She did not see the Defendant on the date of his plea. 
However, the Trial Judge did see and converse with the Defendant at the 
time the plea was taken. There is nothing on the record which would 
indicate that he was unable to enter a plea. He indicated to the Court 
that he was not on medication. His responses were appropriate, and the 
Judge found that his plea was knowingly made. The family of the 
Defendant were present at the time of the plea* Neither the family or 
bhe social worker informed counsel of any concerns about the 
Defendant's ability to enter a plea. Therefore, the Court finds that 
bhe Defendant was capable of entering a knowing and voluntary plea and 
vas not incapacitated at the time that the plea was entered. 
19. The record indicates that the Defendant was advised by the 
Court of the penalty for the offense of Second Degree Murder and 
indicated to the Court that he understood the penalty. 
20. The Defendant claims that counsel for the Defendant was 
incompetent in not investigating the facts further to determine whether 
the first or second incident caused the death of the victim. The 
statements of the Defendant indicated that the victim was alive after 
the first incident, had 'regained consciousness, and was in the process 
of rising. The evidence further indicates that the victim stopped 
breathing almost immediately after the second incident. The medical 
examiner's report classified the death as a homicide and listed the 
cause of death as "multiple craniocerebal injuries, blunt force trauma 
to the head". Under the circumstances, where the Defendant had been 
involved in two incidents which were closely related in time, it would 
be virtually impossible to medically determine which of the attacks 
caused the death or whether it was a combination of the two. Defendant 
has not presented any evidence that additional investigation would have 
uncovered information which is exculpatory. Mr. Famulary testified 
that he believed that a jury may conclude that it was the second attack 
which caused the death. He reasoned that a jury could logically 
conclude that, since the victim survived the first attack but died 
immediately after the second attack, the victim died as a result of the 
second attack. The Court finds this to be a decision which is within 
the broad range of choices that competent counsel may have made in 
undertaking the defense. 
21. A review of the evidence indicates that the Defendant was not 
specifically informed of his right not to incriminate himself. The 
record, however, indicates the Defendant had previously been advised of 
his right not to incriminate himself on two separate occasions (i.e. 
prior to each statement to the police) and had waived this right on 
both occasions. Further, at the hearing in this matter, the Defendant 
did not claim that he was unaware of the right or that he would have 
acted differently if he would have been advised of his right to remain 
silent. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the Defendant 
has failed to establish any"affect that this had on the plea. A review 
of the record indicates that the Defendant was determined to conclude 
this matter by entering a plea. He expressed his desire to end this 
matter quickly to the police, his family, his attorney, and the Court. 
The record indicates that he was determined to plead even after being 
informed that his version of the facts raised a defense. After a 
reivew of the evidence, this Court finds that the Defendant was not 
prejudiced by the Court's failure to remind him of his right to remain 
silent. 
22. A review of the Defendant's statements to the police and the 
statements of various witnesses who the Defendant had communicated with 
tfould also indicate that the decision of counsel not to rely upon the 
defense of intoxication or heat of passion was within the wide range of 
tactic which competent counsel may have under this situation. The 
ability of the Defendant to remember the events which lead up to and 
caused the death of the "victim, his ability to form the intent to 
search for valuables and to take persona property from the residence, 
lis ability to remember where the keys were, his ability to perform 
*arate type kicking motions, his ability to communicate with others 
Immediately after the death of the victim, his ability to drive long 
listances, and the time involved between the first and second incident, 
all make these defenses difficult, 
23. After listening to the witnesses in this matter, the Court is 
convinced that it was the desire of the Defendant to enter the plea 
without a trial. Counsel for Defendant reviewed the police reports and 
verified the information to be true through conversation with the 
)efendant. His review of the facts indicated that the Defendant was 
ware of his actions when he caused the death of Mr. Abegglen. The 
statements of the Defendant to police and others gave the police 
sufficient evidence to bring a strong case against the Defendant. The 
)efendant faced three other felonies at that time and could have been 
:harged with Aggravated Burglary, Aggravated Robbery, and Auto Theft. 
?he State was also considering a charge of Capital Homicide. Under 
;hese facts, it was within the wide range of competency for defense 
:ounsel to follow the wishes of his client in entering this plea. 
24. At the hearing to withdraw the plea, the Defendant testified 
:hat he did not understand what Judge Davidson meant when he asked him 
.f this occurred in the "heat of passion". Defendant testified he 
>elieved Judge Davidson was asking if this occurred while the parties 
rere involved in a homosexual act. The Defendant further testified 
;hat he became upset and that he and Judge Davidson had a dialog 
concerning the meaning of "heat of passion". The discussion that the 
defendant refers to is not part of the transcribed record. Mr. 
'amulary testified that the record was complete, and this Court finds 
hat it is complete. In any event, even assuming the Defendant's 
ersion, he was fully aware that Judge Davidson was not accusing him of 
ieing a homosexual before they went back on the record. 
25. Under the facts of this case, there is no theoretical 
ifference between a plea of guilty and a nolo plea. The Defendant 
learly was willing to submit himself to the sentence authorized by the 
tatute. He admitted to facts which establish the elements of the 
ffense under the statute; and, the facts which he admitted were 
onsistent and supported by the admissions that he had made to the 
olice, his friends and family, and to his attorney. 
26. The Defendant's statement to Judge Davidson that he did not 
intend to cause the death of the victim is consistent with his plea 
under the depraved indifference portion of the Second Degree Murder 
Statute- State v. Fontana, 680 P2d 1042 requires that the Defendant 
must be aware that his conduct created a grave risk to another. As 
indicated above, the Defendant was specifically informed that it would 
be difficult to convict him if he did not know what he was doing. He 
was informed that before he could be convicted the State must show that 
he knowingly participated in conduct which created a grave risk of 
death to another: Nevertheless, after being informed that the Court 
would not accept a plea :if he was not guilty, the Defendant adopted the 
statement of the County-Attorney. A review of the Defendant's actions 
as set forth in paragraph #11 above and of the prosecutor's statement 
would support the Court's conclusion that the Defendant had knowingly 
participated in conduct created a grave risk of death, while evidencing 
a depraved indifference to human life. 
27. In this matter, the Defendant claims that the plea bargain 
was illusory. The Defendant claims that the prosecution threatened to 
charge him as a Habitual Criminal. As indicated previously, the 
parties were unsure of whether the Defendant's prior record would 
support a charge under the Habitual Criminal Statute. As indicated 
previously, the Defendant was brought before the Court to enter a plea 
at his own insistence and prior to the time when either party had been 
able to sort out the facts concerning the Oregon conviction. The 
record now indicates that the Defendant's record would not have 
supported a Habitual Criminal charge. However, the State never 
indicated that it had facts which would support the charge. This was 
merely a possible charge which was cleared up in the process of the 
plea bargain. At the plea hearing, the State indicated: "In addition 
to that the State is foregoing the filing of an Auto Theft charge and a 
possible Habitual Criminal charge, which the Auto Theft charge may 
allow or may have allowed." This is also consistent with defense 
counsel's recollection of the plea bargaining negotiations. Under 
these circumstances, the plea was not illusory. The State merely 
indicated that they felt a Habitual Criminal charge may have been 
possible. There is no indication that the State did not act in good 
faith in its belief that this was a possible charge. Further, the 
statements of the Defendant at the hearing on this motion, make it 
clear that he was only concerned (understandably) about the filing of 
capital homicide charges. The Defendant clearly did not rely upon the 
Habitual Criminal charges in entering into the plea agreement. The 
agreement to forego the Capital Homicide charges was the "key issue" 
and "the only thing that mattered". The Court finds that there was no 
misrepresentation"made to the Defendant concerning the filing of 
Habitual Criminal charges. Further, the dismissal of those charges was 
merely an attempt to cl?2ar up all possible pending charges within 
Uintah County and was/not a concession which the Defendant relied upon 
in entering his plear and was not illusary. 
28. The Defendant also claims that the State's offer to not file 
a Capital Homicide charge was illusory. As indicated above, the 
Defendant did rely upon the State's promise to not charge him with a 
capital offense. Although the Defendant has consistently maintained 
that he did not intend to kill the victim, a jury may choose not to 
believe his self serving statements. If a jury decided that the 
Defendant's characterization of his intent was not credible, the facts 
which surround the second incident could support a determination that 
the Defendant intended to cause the death of the victim. This would 
certainly be an issue for the jury to resolve. The case of State vs. 
Tillman, 750 P2d 546, makes it clear that all the State needs to prove 
is that the Defendant committed the homicide in connection with another 
listed crime. It is not necessary to show that the homicide was 
committed in futherance or to facilitate the listed crime. State vs. 
Bradley, 752 P2d 874, may also be applicable in this case in support of 
Aggravated Burglary as a crime to support the charge of First Degree 
Murder. Although it is clear in this case that the Defendant entered 
the apartment with consent, his intrusion into other areas of the 
apartment after kicking the victim with a karate kick and servely 
beating the victim with his fist may support Aggravated Burglary as a 
supporting offense. Similarly, the use of such force and the 
subsequent removal of personal property from the apartment may justify 
the charge of Aggravated Robbery as a supporting offense. See State 
vs. Glymph 563 P2d 422 (Kansas); State vs. Carcerano, 390 P2d 923 
(Or.); People v. Bartowsheski; 661 P2d 235 (Col); and State v. 
Ulibarui; 668 P2d 568. Where force is used to render the victim 
unconscious, a jury may conclude that the property was taken against 
the will of the owner. A review of the facts in this case which were 
available to the prosecution would indicate that the State could have, 
in good faith, believed that a Capital Homicide charge was viable. It 
is not necessary for this Court to decide whether or not the State 
would have been successful in bringing a First Degree Murder case. The 
record indicates that the prosecution was proceeding in good faith and 
that the theory of the State's case was supported by facts which could 
support a juries determination of guilty. 
The Defendant entered his plea in order to avoid the risks of 
facing a First Degree Murder charge. As a result of the plea, the 
State did not go forward on other felony charges which the State had 
brought or could have brought. In this case, the Defendant freely 
admits that he is guilty of some form of criminal homicide. The issue 
was never whether the Defendant was guilty of a criminal act which 
caused the death of another, it was always which form of criminal 
homicide Defendant was guilty of. The State believed the facts would 
support a finding of guilt under the First Degree Murder Statute. The 
Defendant believed he was not guilty of that offense. The parties 
settled upon a plea to Second Degree Murder. At the time he entered 
his plea, the Defendant had been informed by counsel of the elements of 
the crime that he plead to (including the intent element). Judge 
Davidson had informed the Defendant that he could not be found guilty 
if he did not know what he was doing when he kicked the victim. The 
statements of the Defendant (i.e. the adoptive statement at the time of 
the plea, his statements to the police and others, and his statement to 
tiis attorney that he knew what he was doing) are all consistent with 
his plea. (This is not a case like State v. Breckenridge, 688 P2d 440, 
tfhere there is nothing in the record to support the Defendant's plea. 
\s Judge Davidson observed, the statement of the prosecutor would 
support a finding of guilty. This is more akin to the facts in Hurst 
After taking advantage of the State's offer, the Defendant now is 
not satisfied with his agreement and wishes to withdraw his plea. In 
doing so he appeals to the Court's sense of justice and fair play. 
This Court is not convinced justice would be well served in this case 
by allowing the Defendant to renege on his agreement. This would place 
a tremendous burden on tlhe State to resurrect several cases (including 
the Forgery cases) which are long since stale. It also denies the 
State the benefit of its bargain. 
Based upon a review of all of the evidence, the Court finds that 
the Defendant was adequately represented and that his plea was 
knowingly and voluntarily entered with full knowledge of its 
consequences. The Court further finds that the plea bargain was not 
illusory and that the Defendant is bound by his agreement. The Motion 
of the Defendant is, therefore, denied. 
DATED this 2nd day of April, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
A. LYNN PAYNE, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
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